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BUSH
LOSING THE LAW WAR: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGIC ERRORS
ADMINISTRATION'S
0. McGinnis·
John O.
McGinnis*
INTRODUCTION

The Bush Administration's
Administration's legal performance
performance in the war on terror
was much like its performance
performance in the war in Iraq. In both cases it had
counterproductive
plausible objectives, but employed
employed mistaken, often counterproductive
occasionally foolish strategy. The Bush Administration itself has
and occasionally
admitted mistakes in Iraq.1
Iraq.' But it is also important to describe the
errors in its legal strategy to which it has not yet admitted so that
of
future administrations will not suffer similar defeats in the courts of
law and the courts of public opinion.
The errors in the Bush Administration's
Administration's legal strategy had
common roots. One was an ideological
ideological focus on bolstering executive
consequent lack of pragmatic flexibility in choosing
power and a consequent
tactics that would maximize
maximize the chances of gaining public and
judicial acceptance
of
detention, interrogation, and
acceptance its framework for detention,
trial of terrorists as well as surveillance
surveillance of individuals
individuals residing in
America. The Administration
Administration repeatedly
repeatedly failed to recognize
recognize that
reliance on executive
executive authority alone
alone entailed
entailed a high risk of defeat at
the hands of the Court.
Second, the Administration
Administration underestimated
underestimated the magnitude
magnitude of the
risk that the Court would curb
curb the President's
President's discretion,
discretion, because itit
radically
litigation
radically misunderstood
misunderstood the changed
changed legal environment
environment for litigation
in the twenty-first
century.
Every
aspect
of
American
life
has seen
seen
American
twenty-first
Every
*• Stanford
article is
Stanford Clinton
Clinton Sr.
Sr. Professor
Professor of
of Law,
Law, Northwestern
Northwestern University
University School
School of
of Law.
Law. This
This article
is an
an
expanded
23, 2008,
2008, part
expanded version
version of
of Prof.
Prof. McGinnis'
McGinnis' speech
speech on
on Oct.
Oct. 23,
part of the
the Henry
Henry J.J. Miller Distinguished
Distinguished
Lecture
Lecture Series,
Series, and
and is
is aa revised
revised and
and updated
updated version
version of an essay which first appeared
appeared in Policy Review.
John
clerked for
for Hon.
John 0.
O. McGinnis
McGinnis clerked
Hon. Kenneth
Kenneth W.
W. Starr,
Starr, U.S.
U.S. Court
Court of Appeals
Appeals for the District
District of
of
Columbia. From
From 1987
1987 to 1991,
1991, Professor
Professor McGinnis
McGinnis was
was deputy
deputy assistant
assistant attorney
attorney general in the Office
Office
of
of Legal
Legal Counsel
Counsel at
at the Department
Department of
of Justice.
Justice.
1.
I. In
In 2006,
2006, Bush,
Bush, along
along with
with British
British Prime
Prime Minister
Minister Tony
Tony Blair, admitted "major
"major misjudgments
misjudgments in
in
execution
.... " David
David E.
Concede Errors,
execution of
of Iraq
Iraq war
war ....
E. Sanger &
& Jim Rutenberg,
Rutenberg, Bush and Blair
Blair Concede
Errors. But
But
Defend War, N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, May
May 26,2006,
26, 2006, at
at Al.
AI.
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legalization 22 and as a result of this trend even discretion in
increasing legalization
legalism
the war on terror would likely be seen through the prism of legalism
that applies to domestic criminal law. Moreover, foreign elites,
particularly European elites, would seek to influence our judiciary so
as to tie down what they regard as a dangerous hegemon.
The third systematic error was a failure to recognize that all
Administrations tend to lose power as they age, 33 and wars run a high
risk of exacerbating
exacerbating that loss as the conflict proves less popular than
it was at the initial stage. Of course, the scandals at Abu Ghraib44 and
the specific setbacks in Iraq could not have been predicted. But an
Administration's legal high command-and
command-and here I speak particularly
particularly
of the White House Counsel and Attorney
Attorney General and not those
court-must be particularly
particularly mindful
simply defending
defending the policies in court-must
of the general downside risks so as to minimize the worst possible
outcomes.
As a result, the Administration
Administration would have been well advised to
take every step to bolster its legal position as early as practicable.
practicable. It
could have done that by securing
securing from Congress framework
legislation
legislation for detention, military tribunals, surveillance, and perhaps
even interrogation. Because
Because citizens are generally most supportive of
of
an Administration
phenomenon so
Administration at the beginning
beginning of a conflict
conflict (a phenomenon
so
well know among political scientists
given the name
scientists that is has been given
5), the
"rally
around
the
flag
effect"
terms
of
"rally around the flag effect"\ the terms
trade of the
Administration
with
Congress
would
Administration
have been likely favorable,
2.
2. For a discussion of several aspects
aspects of the increase in American
American civil
civil litigation,
litigation, see Marc
Marc S.
S.
REV. 3 (1986).
(1986).
After the Litigation
Litigation Explosion,
Explosion, 46 MD.
MD. L. REv.
Galanter, The Day After
3. Steven G. Calabresi
or King?, 115
Calabresi &
& James Lindgren,
Lindgren, The President:
President: Lightning Rod or
liS YALE L. J.
2611
2611 (2006)
(2006) (arguing
(arguing that the
the incumbent
incumbent president's
president's political
political party tends
tends to
to lose
lose power
power in
in mid-term
mid-term and
off-year elections
elections as voters blame the president
president for
for national
national woes).
4.
In 2004, reports emerged
4. In
emerged that American
American military
military personnel
personnel physically,
physically, sexually, and
psychologically
Ghraib prison
prison in Iraq. See Scott
Scott Higham
Higham and
and Joe
Joe Stephens,
psychologically abused
abused detainees
detainees at the Abu Ghraib
New
ofPrison
New Details
Details 0/
Prison Abuse Emerge:
Emerge: Abu Ghraib
Ghraib Detainees' Statements Describe
Describe Sexual Humiliation
Humiliation
and Savage Beatings,
Beatings, WASH.
WASH. POST,
POST, May
May 21,
21, 2004, at
at AOl.
AOI. The
The Taguba Report, the
the result
result of
of the
military's inquiry
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocsliraql
inquiry into
into events at
at Abu
Abu Ghraib,
Ghraib, is available
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/
tagubarpt.html.
tagubarpt.html.
5. See William
Opinion Leadership?:
William D.
D. Baker
Baker & John
John R. Oneal,
Oneal, Patriotism
Patriotism or Opinion
Leadership?: The Nature
Nature and
Originsof
the "Rally 'Round
Origins
o/the
'Round the Flag"
Flag" Effect, 45 J. CONFLICT
CONFLICT RESOL.
RESOL. 661 (2001).
(2001). See also
also Matthew
Matthew A.
A.
Baum,
the Rally-Round-the-Flag
Constituent Foundations
Foundations of
o/the
Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon,
Phenomenon, 46 INT'L STUD.
STIJD. Q. 263
Baum, The Constituent
(2002).
(2002).
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even when the Senate
Senate was controlled briefly by the Democrats in late
2001 and 2002, not to mention in 2003 when Republicans
Republicans took over
both Houses and the United
United States was still savoring victory in Iraq.
To be sure, nothing is certain in the legislative process
process and deals
would have had to have been struck, but it seems very likely the
Administration early on could have obtained legislation that would
have met its strategic
strategic objectives.
consequences of eschewing
eschewing Congress and relying on
The consequences
vindication of executive power in court have been grave. Far from
Administration's policies6
strengthening executive
strengthening
executive power, the Administration's
it.6
weakened it.
have weakened
that have
defeats
Court
generated a series of Supreme
Supreme Court defeats that
generated
These losses contributed to a public perception that its policy for
captured terrorists was in disarray, and still worse, that
dealing with captured
the United States was entrenching
entrenching on liberties as never before, when
trenched on
the reality is that the war in Iraq and the war on terror has trenched
liberties less than previous
previous wars and even the detainees at
Guantanamo
had
greater
Guantanamo
greater protections at trial than their counterparts in
7
executive power also
unnecessary reliance on executive
earlier wars. The unnecessary
permitted foreign critics to claim that President Bush was a lone
combatants, whereas
ranger in his approach
approach to detention
detention of enemy combatants,
endorsement by Congress of specific polices would have
early endorsement
underscored the reality that he reflected the consensus
underscored
consensus of the
American people at the time.
Administration's errors were
Let me stress at the outset that the Administration's
prudence and judgment, not morality
morality or ethics. After
After
ones of prudence
of
11, the United States was confronted with a new kind of
September 11,
enemy made all the more fearsome in an age of weapons of mass
destruction. The Bush Administration's
lawyers had to confront
Administration's lawyers
novel kinds of questions
questions without a clear
clear legal map. These errors do
not make their service
service any less patriotic and admirable.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
6. Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld,
U.s. 507 (2004) (finding that a United
United States
States citizen held as an enemy
combatant had a due process right to contest his detainment);
detainment); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
U.S. 466, 484 (2004)
combatant
habeas claims of Guantanarno
Guantanamo Bay detainees);
(holding that district courts could hear habeas
detainees); Hamdan
Hamdan v.
established by the Bush
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
Rurnsfeld,
557 (2006) (holding that the military
military commissions
commissions established
Administration violated the Unifonn
Uniform Code of Military
Military Justice
Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
Tribunals and Legal
7. This point is ably made in Jack Goldsmith & Cass Sunstein, Military
Military Tribunals
CONST. COMM.
Culture:
COMM. 261,
261, 288 (2002).
Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST.

Published by Reading Room, 2009
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 379 2008-2009

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
380

GEORGIA
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
REVIEW

[Vol. 25:2
(Vol.

of
Yet some law professors
professors have unfortunately called the work of
8
8
these lawyers incompetent
incompetent to the point of being unethical. Amnesty
International has even suggested
suggested that some of the lawyers be
be
9 The translation of legitimate disputes
investigated
for
war
crimes.
investigated
about law into matters of ethics and criminal law is an attempt to cut
which law is made in a democratic
democratic and
off the legitimate debate
debate by which
pluralist society. Amnesty
any
Amnesty International
International has never provided
provided any
showing that the Administration
lawyers'
arguments
were
made
in
Administration lawyers'
bad faith or lacked
lacked a basis in law, even if they were rejected
rejected by some
courts and other scholars. 10
courts
10
I. GETrING
GETTING SOME BIG THINGS
THINGS RIGHT

Before analyzing the Bush Administration's
Administration's strategy on the war on
terror, it is important
important to reject some lines of critique made popular by
its opponents. First, critics are wrong to suggest that terrorism only
enforcement rather than the use of war
requires enhanced
enhanced law enforcement
powers. Second, critics are also wrong to suggest that the United
United
international law even if that law is not
States is bound
bound by international
incorporated into our domestic law.
The 9/11 attack on the United States
States was an act of war no less than
Japan's
organization
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Al-Qaeda
AI-Qaeda was a military
military organization
8. See Kathleen
Raised by the OLe
OLC Torture
Torture Memorandum,
Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised
Memorandum, I1 J. NAT'L. SEC. L.
&
POL'Y 455, 463 (2005)
(2005) ("The substantive inaccuracies of the Bybee
Memorandum are so serious that
& POL'y
Bybee Memorandum
they implicate
authors.").
implicate the legal ethics obligations
obligations of its authors.
").
9. "...
" ... Amnesty
Amnesty International
International calls upon state
state bar authorities to investigate
investigate the Administration
Administration
lawyers
lawyers alleged to be involved in the torture scandal for failing to meet professional
professional responsibility
responsibility
standards. The attorneys
subsequent
attorneys who wrote various legal opinions that may have provided cover for subsequent
investigated include [former
[former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
crimes and who should be investigated
of
Legal Counsel Jay]
Jay] Bybee
Bybee and David Addington, General
General Counsel to Vice President Cheney;
Cheney; Robert
Robert
Homeland Security, and three attorneys in the Office
Delahunty, former Special Counsel in the Office of Homeland
of Legal Counsel-John
Counsel-John Yoo, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
General, Patrick Philbin, Deputy
Deputy
Assistant Attorney General,
General, and Jack
Jack Goldsmith, former Assistant
Assistant Attorney General. We also call on the
Justice Department's Office of Professional
Professional Responsibility
Responsibility to make public
public the findings of its
memo." Amnesty International USA,
investigation into the Bybee
Bybee memo."
USA, Statement of Dr. William F. Schulz
Executive Director, ANNUAL
ANNUAL REPORT
REPORT (2005),
(2005), available
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport/
http://www.amnestyusa.orglannualreportJ
statement.html.
staternent.html.
10. David
University of San Diego has superbly discussed these issues in depth in
in
David McGowan of the University
his recent
Decency, Due Care,
and Lawyering in the War
War on Terror,
Terror,
his
recent article,
article, Decency,
Care, and
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.c fm?abstractid--975124.
http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/papers.cfin?abstractjd=975124.
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that was attempting to harm
hann and disrupt the United States as a nationharm individuals. As such, the action against
state rather than simply hann
it cannot be understood within a law enforcement
enforcement paradigm,
paradigm, because
that paradigm presupposes
of
presupposes that the actors are within the bounds of
civil society. Instead, Al-Qaeda
AI-Qaeda and other Islamic
Islamic terrorists act in a
world that predates
predates civil society, because between
between such strangers
there is no common government responsible for law enforcement.
enforcement. AlAIQaeda and its members
members are not part of our social compact and thus do
not enjoy the rights that derive from it. AI-Qaeda's
Al-Qaeda's lack of
of
recognition
recognition as a nation-state does not make it a part of the social
compact. The Bush Administration
Administration is as right to make war on AIAl11
Qaeda
day.
Qaeda as Thomas Jefferson
Jefferson was on the Barbary pirates of his day.ll
Any administration
constitutional
administration should scrupulously adhere to all constitutional
laws that have been enacted through our carefully wrought
wrought
procedures
of
bicameralism
and
presentment.
International
law
can,
procedures
bicameralism
International
of course, become binding as well when the President and the Senate
Senate
agree to ratify a treaty or when Congress decides to incorporate
incorporate the
norms of international
international law into a statute.
But when the critics of the Bush Administration
Administration denounced
denounced it for
violating international
international law, they did not confine themselves to
complaints about international
international rules that have become
become domestic
obligations. They complain, for instance, that Bush violated
violated a norm
of customary
customary international law in invading
invading Iraq or violated an
interpretation
proclaimed by other
Charter proclaimed
other
interpretation of the United Nations Charter
States has a
nations or international bodies even if the United States
12
2
different
interpretation.' They argue that the United States should
different interpretation.
follow interpretations
interpretations of treaties
treaties of international
international bodies and
13
combatants.
enemy combatants. 13
of enemy
committees
committees in its treatment of

11. For a discussion
II.
discussion of Jefferson's
Jefferson's dealings
dealings with the Barbary states, see GERHARD CASPER,
CASPER,
SEPARATING
POWER 45--67
45-67 (1997).
SEPARATING POWER
(1997).
12. See Henry H. Perritt,
Perritt, Jr., Iraq
Future of United
States Foreign
Foreign Policy:
of
Iraq &
& the Future
United States
Policy: Failures
Failures of
SYRACUSE J. INT'L & COM.
Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE
COM. 149, 163
163 (2004).
13. See Peter Jan
Nation at the Expense of
Individuals? Defining
Jan Honigsberg, Protecting
Protecting the Nation
of Individuals?
Defining the
U.S. Executive Power
Power at Home and
and Abroad
Abroad in Times of Crisis
Chasing "Enemy Combatants"
Combatants'"
Scope of u.s.
Crisis Chasing
and Circumventing
Circumventing International
InternationalLaw: A
Sanctioned Abuse,
U.C.L.A. 1.
J. INT'L L. &
&
and
A License for
for Sanctioned
Abuse. 12 U.C.L.A.
1, 24-25 (2007).
FOREIGN AFF. 1,24-25
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The Administration
Administration has no obligation to follow such norms. First,
the Supremacy
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes the
supreme law of the land only treaties and statutes, and only the legal
interpretations of our domestic
interpretations
domestic courts or other institutions designed
14
But it is more than a formal
by the domestic political branches. 14
error for the United States to consider itself bound by international
"raw" international
international law
law unratified by the political
political branches. Such "raw"
ls
15
has a large democratic deficit. It does not emerge
emerge from any
unrepresentative elites in
democratic process but is instead shaped by unrepresentative
the form of international
international law professors or international
international jurists who
Democracy has its defects,
sometimes hail from authoritarian nations. Democracy
but elections
elections and open debate give us the assurance
assurance that norms that
our political branches choose are likely superior than those that
emerge
emerge from the uncertain process of international law.
Indeed, American
than unratified
American law is not only likely better than
international
international law for Americans
Americans because of its democratic
provenance, but in many areas is also likely to aid foreigners.
provenance,
Because
Because of the position
position of the United
United States
States as the dominant
dominant
economic
and
military
power
in
the
international system, it has strong
economic
military power
incentives
incentives to provide international public goods, such as appropriate
detention
international terrorists, that benefit foreigners as well as
detention of international
Administration has not only been doing
Americans. Thus, the Administration
Americans
a
favor
when
it does not allow international
Americans
international law to
constrain the President's otherwise lawful discretion, it has been
doing a service
service for citizens around the world.
II. DETENTION
DETENTION

The United States faced three issues in adapting the war paradigm
paradigm
to hold prisoners
captured in the war on terror. First, unlike
prisoners of war captured
conventional
Al-Qaeda and
conventional wars, prisoners taken in the war against AI-Qaeda
other organizations are generally
generally not in uniform and sometimes
sometimes do
u.s.

CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. U.S. CONST.
0. McGinnis &
Our Law?, 59 STAN.
15. See John o.
& Ilya
llya Somin,
Somin, Should International
International Law Be Part
Part of
o/Our
STAN.
REV. 1175,
1175, 1193-1224
1193-1224 (2007) (describing in far more detail the huge democratic
L. REv.
democratic deficit that besets
besets
international
law).
intemationallaw).
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not in fact
fact proclaim
proclaim their allegiance
allegiance to their organizations.
organizations. 1616 Their
Their
uncertain
uncertain and often opaque
opaque identity
identity creates
creates a greater
greater risk that
individuals
individuals will be
be captured
captured in error. Second, the
the war against
against AlAIQaeda
Qaeda does not have
have as clear
clear aa stopping
stopping point as conventional
conventional wars,
conventional wars
wars generally
generally can
can be ended
ended by capturing
capturing the
because conventional
enemy's
In particular,
particular, because
because these
these combatants
combatants are
are part
part of
of
enemy's territory. In
an irregular
irregular army and cannot
cannot be forced by their
their own
own domestic law to
detention may extend
extend long after
after their
their
that length
length of detention
persist in fighting, that
dissipated.
the
cause
has
allegiance
to
allegiance
difference affecting
affecting detention
detention between
between conventional
conventional war
The third difference
and the war
war on terror is more general. The
The Bush
Bush Administration
Administration
concerted legal
should have realized
realized that it would face a much more
more concerted
should
effort to release these prisoners
prisoners than Administrations
Administrations in previous
conventional wars faced. The precedents limiting the Administration
Administration
conventional
17
17
relied upon were generally from World War II era. Yet since that
time federal courts have constrained
constrained government
government discretion
discretion in
20 In
18
ordered states to raise taxes.
running schools l8
and prisons 1l99 and ordered
taxes?O
In
2211
decided a Presidential election. It is a short step to
2000, they decided
bringing more judicial regulation
regulation to war, particularly
particularly when that war is
bringing
appear more closely related to law
not conventional and may appear
enforcement. Moreover, since that time the world has become
smaller: some of the Justices of the Court have been increasingly
increasingly
interested in making sure that the Court takes into account
account a
-- one that
jurisprudence --one
constitutional jurisprudence
transnational
transnational perspective
perspective on constitutional
garners respect for United
United States around the world and22 respect
respect for
for
jurists.
peer
of
networks
international networks of peer juristS?2
themselves
themselves in their international
OF TERROR
TERROR vii-viii
(2002).
QAEDA: BROTHERHOOD
BROTHERHOOD OF
PAUL L. WILLIAMS,
16. See PAUL
WILLIAMS, AL QAEDA:
vii-viii (2002).
Quirin, 317
317 U.S.
U.S. 1(1942).
1 (1942).
U.S. I1 (1946);
(1946); Ex
Ex Parte
Parte Quirin,
17. See In
re Yamashita,
In re
Yamashita, 327
327 U.S.
127 S.
S. Ct.
Ct. 2738
School Dist.
Dist. No.
Schools v.
v. Seattle
Seattle School
in Community
Community Schools
Parents Involved
Involved in
18. See Parents
No. I,1, 127
2738
of Topeka,
Topeka,
v. Board
Board of
of Education
Education of
1357 (1978);
(1978); Brown
Brown v.
Brinkman, 439
439 U.S.
U.S. 1357
(2007);
Dayton Bd.
v. Brinkman,
Bd. of
of Ed.
Ed. v.
(2007); Dayton
347 U.S.
U.S. 483
483 (1954).
(1954).
Shawnee County,
County, Kansas,
Kansas, 347
19. See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
school disIricts
districts
495 U.S.
U.S. 33
33 (1990)
(1990) (holding federal courts could require
v. Jenkins
Jenkins 495
Missouri v.
20. See Missouri
require school
to levy taxes in excess of limits set by state statute to fund school desegregation plan).
U.S. 98, 121 (2000).
21. SeeBushv.Gore,531
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.s.
21.
543 U.S.
U.S. 551
551 (2005) (holding unconstitutional
Roper v.
Simmons, 543
22. See generally
generally Roper
v. Simmons,
unconstitutional state laws
the
courts against
against the
near unanimity
unanimity of
of foreign
foreign courts
relying in
in part
part on
on near
allowing the death penalty for juveniles, relying
REV. 1931
Authority and
andAuthorities.
Authorities 94 VA. L. REv.
also Frederick
Frederick Schauer,
Schauer, Authority
for juveniles).
death penalty
penalty for
death
juveniles). See also
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy
of federal
courts citing
citing foreign law);
on the
the propriety
propriety of
(2008) (essay
(essay on
(2008)
federal courts
law); Harris Meyer, Justice
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Administration
In light of these potential problems,
problems, the Bush Administration

should have immediately acknowledged
acknowledged the differences
differences that
unconventional
wars
made
to
the
legal
framework
for holding
unconventional
anomalies through the generous
of
detainees and tempered the anomalies
generous use of
legal process, with military tribunals
tribunals providing the initial process.
Because
Because of the legal climate and the possibility that its war effort
would become unpopular and thus more liable to legal attack, it
should also have sought, as soon as practicable,
Congress'
practicable, Congress'
endorsement of these legal structures
legislation
endorsement
structures through framework legislation
that would have supplemented
supplemented the military process with review by
by
Article III courts under a deferential standard.
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, however, the Bush Administration
Administration took a grudging
approach to the granting of process and resorted to unilateral
strategies
strategies that were easily portrayed as lawyers'
lawyers' tricks. For instance,
at first the Administration
Administration argued that it had no obligation to give any
substantial
determine whether
substantial process to detennine
whether those caught on the
battlefield were in fact enemy combatants,
combatants, even if they were United
States citizens. This was a mistake even as matter of theory, not to
or
mention prudence. The key question determining
determining whether the war or
law enforcement
paradigm
should
apply
is
whether
the
individual's
individual's
enforcement paradigm
action should be judged
judged inside or outside our social compact. A
citizen is within our social compact and should be treated within the
war paradigm only if he has chosen
chosen to be an enemy combatant.
combatant. He
certainly
deserves
substantial
process
to
challenge
his
status before
certainly
substantial
challenge
being treated as outside the pale.
Thus, there was a substantial
substantial risk that the Court would hold, as it
did in Hamdi
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, that an American citizen had a right to
substantial
substantial process to challenge his designation as an enemy
23
combatant. 23
Hamdi only a single justice, Justice Clarence
Indeed, in Hamdi

Wades Into International
Waters Again,
Again, DAILY Bus. REV.,
available at:
Wades
International Waters
REV., May 17, 2005, available
at:
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1116246912761;
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1116246912761;
Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the
Southern Center
Center for
Studies, Oct. 28, 2003,
http://www.southemcenter.org/OConnor_
Southern
for International
International Studies,
2003, http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_
conclusions reached by the international community, "although not
transcript.pdf (stating that legal
legal conclusions
formally binding
binding upon our decisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in American
American
courts.").
23. Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld,
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
533 (2004).
U.S. 507,
507,533
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deferred
Thomas, would have automatically
automatically 24
deferred to executive
status.
combatant
Hamdi's
on
determination
Hamdi' s combatant status. 24
While the Court directly resolved only the question of a United
States citizen's
citizen's due process rights, the Bush Administration should
noncitizens as well. By
have extended
extended this right at the outset to noncitizens
incorrectly
showing it was scrupulous
scrupulous in taking care not to have incorrectly
detained noncombatants; the Administration could have forestalled
forestalled
criticism and showed that its regime was not lawless, but carefully
carefully
considered. Even more importantly, the more internal process it gave
on such key issues, the less likely the Supreme Court would hold that
individuals had full rights to habeas corpus. Some swing Justices, like
Stephen Breyer, care about preventing errors and are not much
concerned about the rubric under which that error correction
concerned
correction
Hamdi itself,
itself, the Court indicated that the military
occurred. In Hamdi
tribunals, at least in the first instance, might provide sufficient
25
status. 25
combatant status.
challenge to enemy
enemy combatant
process for a challenge
For similar reasons, the Administration should have from the
outset publicly provided a process
process for determining when individuals
individuals
were no longer substantial threats or could provide
provide substantial
AI-Qaeda are irregular enemy
information. Because
Because members of Al-Qaeda
combatants, not common criminals, the United States
States cannot
cannot be put
to the choice of trying these detainees
detainees and releasing
releasing them to the
battlefield
to
fight
again.
But
their
irregular
nature
makes it less clear
battlefield
irregular
that they will fight again: no territorial
territorial power can compel
compel them. A
process for reviewing their dangerousness
dangerousness and information
information value
might even have given detainees
detainees incentives
incentives to rethink their
their
commitment to jihad and consider
how
they
could
make
concrete
consider
concrete
commitments to show that they would not go back to the fight.
commitments
Administration did, however, lawyers in the United
Whatever the Administration
United
States were going to file lawsuits on behalf of the prisoners seeking
seeking
more and better process and rights indistinguishable from Americans
accused of crimes. The basic response of the Administration
Administration to this
prospect
prospect was to keep detainees at Guantanamo. Because Guantanamo
Guantanamo
24. Id.
[d. at 579.
25. Id.
[d. at 538.
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is not part of the United States and yet controlled by it, these legal
strategists believed it was the perfect place to hold the prisoners more
easily than they could in foreign territory, and yet be immune from
metaphysical sovereignty
sovereignty
the reach of United States courts. To split metaphysical
from control was extremely clever, but it was clearly vulnerable to
attack as a legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court fifty years ago
refused jurisdiction
jurisdiction over habeas claims in a case that arose in Allied
Germany, 26 such precedent
occupied Germany,26
precedent cannot be relied on to hold up
when translated
to
a
new
context
in a high profile case like this one.
translated
Bush, in which it
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush,
should
insisted on taking jurisdiction of habeas cases at Guantanamo, should
27
substantial risk. 27
have been seen as a substantial
It is the Bush Administration's
Administration's legal strategy that in large measure
has made Guantanamo
Guantanamo a symbol of lawless in the Administration's
Administration's
circumstances suggests to the
war on terror. Its creation under these circumstances
rather
outside world that the United States was playing legal games rather
Administration
than following principles
principles of law. And because
because the Administration
was making these decisions without legislative input, it could be
portrayed
eccentric and malevolent rather than a faithful agent of
portrayed as eccentric
of
the American
American people.
Instead
Instead of resorting to a legal slight of hand, the Administration
Administration
should have gone to Congress
to
bolster
Congress
bolster its case. If Congress
Congress had
from the beginning endorsed
endorsed the framework for holding
holding detainees
detainees
outlined above,
above, the Court would have been unlikely to disturb this
deference are both
settlement. The reasons
reasons for such deference
both doctrinal
doctrinal and
practical.
As
a
doctrinal
matter
the
Court
gives
substantial
deference
practical.
doctrinal matter
deference
to Congress's weighing
weighing of the costs and benefits
benefits of various
procedures.
procedures. In a recent
recent book, Professor Eric
Eric Posner and Adrian
Adrian
Vermeule
deference in
Vermeule suggest that the Court
Court should
should give
give this kind of deference
the cases concerning
terrorism
to
the
executive,
because
Court's
concerning terrorism
the executive, because the Court's
institutional
institutional competence
competence in
in devising
devising responses
responses to terrorism
terrorism is much
much
28
28
less than that of the executive.
executive. But
But the executive
executive may
may not have
have the
26.
26. Johnson
Johnson v. Eisentrager,
Eisentrager, 339
339 U.S.
U.S. 763,790-91
763,790-91 (1950).
(1950).
27.
478 (2004).
27. 542
542 U.S. 466,
466, 478
(2004).
28.
POSNER & ADRIAN
28. ERic
ERIC POSNER
ADRIAN VERMEULE,
VERMEULE, TERROR
TERROR IN
IN THE
THE BALANCE
BALANCE (2006).
(2006).
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appropriate incentives
appropriate
incentives to make the tradeoff
tradeoff between liberty and
security. It is more likely to discount all liberty interests because of
of
its recognition that the greatest risks to its political standing come
come
from a lapse in security, however
improbable
the
cause,
rather
than
however improbable
from complaints about liberties foregone.
More importantly from a strategic perspective, whatever
whatever degree of
of
deference
deference the Court should give to the executive as matter of
of
normative
principle,
as
a
matter
of
realpolitik
the
Court
is
much
more
normative
reluctant to disturb the judgment
judgment of Congress
Congress than a decision by the
executive. Such action would fly much more clearly in the face of the
popular will.
Moreover, such a framework statute would have also permitted
permitted the
United States to hold these prisoners, as they did German prisoners
and other previous captives,
captives, in the United States, thus dispensing
with the negative symbolism of a place that can easily portrayed
portrayed as a
legal netherworld. It may be argued that the Administration still
needed
needed a jurisdiction outside the territorial United States
States to make
prisoners'
of
prisoners' habeas petitions
petitions less likely to succeed. The content of
rights protected by habeas, however, have been historically flexible
and context dependent. 29
29 If the courts were satisfied that the prisoners
were getting the amount of process that Congress judged reasonable
reasonable
for enemy prisoners,
prisoners, they would be unlikely to require substantive
changes.
It might be argued that my view that the Bush administration
administration could
could
have avoided Court
of
Court defeats by obtaining congressional
congressional enactment
enactment of
their polices into law is undermined by the Supreme Court's decision
in Boumediene
Boumediene v. Bush in 2008.30
2008. 30 After judicial
judicial defeats, the Bush
Administration
had
finally
gone
to
Congress
to get a framework for
Administration
detention
detention of captured
captured terrorists 31 and a framework for military
32
tribunals to try them.
them.32
Nevertheless, in Boumediene the Court held
held
29. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
& Daniel J. Meltzer,
CorpusJurisdiction,
Rights, and
and
Meltzer, Habeas
Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction, Substantive
Substantive Rights,
the War on Terror,
Terror, 120 HARv.
HARV. L. REV.
REV. 2029, 2095-96 (2007)
(2007) ("But absent clear statutory guidance,
habeas
habeas courts have mostly operated
operated within the Common Law Model,
Model, fusing a commitment
commitment to the
the
protection
attentive to institutional
equities.").
institutional realities and the balance of equities.
").
protection of liberty with a flexible spirit attentive
30. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)
31.
2005, 119 Stat. 2739.
3\. Detention Treatment
Treatment Act of
of2oo5,
32. Military
of 2006,28
U.S.C.A. 2241.
2241.
Military Commissions Act of2oo6,
28 U.S.C.A.
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the Congress's
Congress's decision
decision in the Military
Military Commission
Commission Act
Act to cut off
off
the
33
review
review of
of habeas
habeas petitions
petitions of those detained
detained was
was unconstitutional.
unconstitutional.33
In
In the
the course
course of
of this holding, it also stated that
that the legal
legal process,
including review
review by the appellate
appellate court, provided
provided by
by Congress
Congress in
in the
Detention
of
Detention Act, did not provide a sufficient
sufficient substitute
substitute for the
the rights of
34
habeas
habeas corpus.
cOrpUS. 34
In my view,
view, however, this defeat actually
actually confirms
confirms that
that the Bush
Bush
Administration
Administration made a grave error in failing
failing to have gone to
Congress earlier. One does not have to be strong realist
realist to believe
believe
Bush
that the
the result would likely have been
been different if the Bush
that
administration had gotten the same legislation passed in 2001 or early
administration
early
2002.
2002. First, the legal challenge
challenge would have arisen
arisen when
when the memory
was very fresh. In contrast, by the time the Court decided the
of 9/11 was
the nation had not been attacked for almost seven years
2008
case
in
case
memory of the threat had receded. Second, an earlier court
and the memory
challenge of a congressional
congressional settlement t would have
have arisen when
challenge
Bush was a relatively
relatively popular
popular President, favored for reelection,
reelection, or
or
challenge to the congressional
congressional
newly reelected. Instead, the challenge
framework came
came when President Bush was the lamest
lamest of lame ducks.
framework
President
challenge had come earlier
Third, if the challenge
earlier at a time when President
eschewed reliance solely on his own executive
Bush had eschewed
executive power and
and
ratification
congressional input into
had sought congressional
ratification of his policies
before judicial
judicial defeat, he would have had reputation
reputation for greater
greater
conciliation
conciliation and moderation. Instead, by the time Boumediene was
heard, he had lost the respect of legal elites, because
because of extravagant
extravagant
legal claims such as those embodied in the so-called
so-called torture memo
and the resulting adverse publicity. After such events the Supreme
administration with discretion
Court was less likely to trust the administration
enactments it belatedly obtained.
vouchsafed by the congressional enactments
Finally, by 2008 the Court had been emboldened
emboldened by the praise it had
received for previous decisions rejecting unilateral Bush
administration policies. Had the Court faced the same issues in 2003
2005, it would have been less certain of the reception of a
or even 2005,
Id. at 2240
33. Id.
Id.
34. Id.
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decision adverse to an administration backed by Congress
Congress and thus
would have faced a very different calculus in deciding whether to
uphold the congressional
congressional settlement.
The ready availability
availability of a congressional solution raises the
question of why it was not sought. One rational explanation
explanation is that
the Administration
thought
that
using
Congress
would detract from
Administration
its project of using the crisis to bolster executive
executive authority. In
In
of
particular, Vice President Cheney, who had seen the decline
decline of
executive authority occasioned by Watergate
Watergate and Vietnam, spoke out
executive
35 This strategy,
frequently of the need to restore executive power. 35
however, was imprudent. First, it was not likely to succeed. The
Supreme
Supreme Court had only two consistent
consistent supporters of executive
36 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist,
power-Justices Scalia and Thomas. 36
power-Justices
Counsel-an office dedicated
dedicated
who had worked in the Office of Legal Counsel-an
preserving that power, had ruled against the executive
executive in such
to preserving
such
37
important cases as the Independent
celebrated
Act,37 and had celebrated
Independent Counsel Act,
the Court's curbing of executive
executive overreaching
overreaching in Youngstown Sheet
38
Sawyer. 38
Co. v.
&
& Tube Co.
v. Strnyer.
But second, it is a mistake to risk substantial harm to an important
policy to build up precedents for an undefined future eventuality. The
interpretation
interpretation of executive
executive power has waxed and waned over the
course of American
Justices' reaction to
American history, dependent largely
largely on Justices'
constellation of political power
the felt necessities of the time and the constellation
in Congress and in the nation. Even had the Bush Administration
Administration won
a victory for the executive branch in the context of detention, it
would be distinguished away, if future justices
justices believe that
circumstances warrant.
circumstances

VandeHei, Clash is Latest Chapter
Chapterin Bush Effort to Widen Executive Power,
35. Peter Baker &
& Jim VandeHei,
Power,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21,
21, 2005,
2005, at Al.
AI.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487
36. See,
487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)
(1988) (Scalia,
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
(1988).
37. Morrison v. Olson, 487
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
ITWAS 94 (1987).
(1987).
38. WILLIAM
WILLIAM REHNQUIST,
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT,
COURT, How IT Is, How IT
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III. INTERROGATION
INTERROGAnON METHODS
III.

Once again
again the Administration
Administration had
had serious
serious issues to address
address in
in
Once
used on those detained.
determining the interrogation
interrogation methods
methods to be used
determining
one hand, any administration
administration should have
have wanted to be
be able
able to
On the one
stop
to
information
interrogations methods
methods that would elicit
elicit information
stop
use interrogations
9/11. On the other hand, any administration
administration
attacks on the order of 9/11.
attacks
acted
should have been
been eager
eager to show that the United States
States acted
should
humanely with respect
respect to even
even egregious
egregious wrongdoers
wrongdoers and in
humanely
Restraint
Convention.
Torture
Restraint
particular followed the strictures of the Torture
particular
underscores the
our
adherence to our own
own laws underscores
the attractiveness
attractiveness of our
and adherence
ideas against radical
radical Islam. This
civilization in the global battle
battle of ideas
civilization
American tradition goes
goes back
back to the Revolutionary
Revolutionary War when George
American
prisoners even
even after
after
Washington insisted that the American army take prisoners
Washington
Hessians
Hessians slaughtered
slaughtered his soldiers
soldiers without quarter
quarter at Fort Washington.
Washington.
That balance
balance might have been best struck again by going to
Congress and seeking framework legislation.
legislation. Congress should, and
Congress
authorized the Administration
Administration to use harsh interrogation
interrogation
would, have authorized
circumstances where
where such methods
methods short of torture in the circumstances
necessary to get information
information to forestall
forestall attacks. A system
system
were necessary
requiring personal and recorded authorization
authorization by a Cabinet official in
specific cases would provide substantial safeguards
safeguards that these
specific
necessary. To be
and
where
selectively
used
only
methods would be
selectively
would
sure, this authorization would have been a messy process and would
have publicized the Administration's
Administration's methods, when secrecy could
enemy to prepare for
itself have value by making it harder for the enemy
controversial
questioning. But nothing on a matter as controversial as this is kept
secret long in Washington and when Congress set limits to the
secret
Administration's interrogation process as it did in 2006 it was also a
Administration's
messy process. The deliberation and consensus that Congress could
educated the world to the
have provided earlier on would have educated
interrogations were needed in the interest of the
reasons that such interrogations
safety not only of the United States but of other nations that were
threatened by the mass slaughter of modem terrorism.
threatened
But whether or not the Administration
Administration chose to go to Congress to
interrogations methods, it could hardly
reinforce
reinforce the legality of its interrogations
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have chosen a worse strategy than it pursued. In a memo written to
Counsel
Alberto Gonzales on August 1, 2002, the Office of Legal
Legal Counsel
provided a general interpretation
interpretation of the the Torture
Torture Convention by
limiting the concept
concept of torture to the infliction
infliction of physical
physical pain
pain
"equivalent
in
intensity
to
the
pain
accompanying
serious
"equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
physical
39
function.",,39
impairment of
of bodily
bodily function.
injury such as organ failure or impairment
amounted
According to the memo, the only psychological
psychological harm that amounted
psychological harm "leading
"leading to
to torture would be that leading
leading to psychological
significant duration, e.g. lasting months or even years."''
years.',40 Finally, the
significant
memo concludes
concludes that the President has the constitutional
constitutional authority to
set even
even those strictures aside if they impaired his ability to41order
commander in
as commander
interrogations
interrogations pursuant to
to his
his authority
authority as
in chief.
chief. 41
It is not my purpose here to dispute these conclusions
conclusions as a legal
correctness, the memo was
matter, but to show that whatever
whatever their correctness,
counterproductive and should have been seen as such at the
utterly counterproductive
time. Indeed, my strongest reaction as a former official at the Office
of Legal Counsel was not that of other observers who attacked the
legal analysis or even the morality
morality of the memorandum. Instead, I
saw it as a bureaucratic
bureaucratic blunder
blunder committed
committed not so much by the
attorneys at OLC but by the White House Counsel and others in the
Administration who asked for this kind of analysis.
Administration
First, to anyone who has worked in the collaborative
collaborative process of the
executive
executive branch, it was clear that this memo would be leaked, and
leaked at the most inconvenient
inconvenient time to the Administration. One rule
I had at the Office
Office of Legal Counsel was to consider how the
phrasing and framing of a memo I wrote would look on the first page
of the Washington
Washington Post.
Post. It would not take much imagination
imagination to see
sweeping language
that the abstract analysis and sweeping
language in its statutory
analysis would allow opponents of the Administration to paint the
analysis as radical and unbounded. When its statutory analysis was
combined
combined with the claim that the President
President has authority to disregard
the limitations of the Torture Convention whenever he thought this
39. See Memorandum
Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales from Jay Bybee,
Bybee, Acting Assistant
Assistant Attorney General, Re:
Standards
U.S. C.
§§ 2340--2340A.
2340-2340A. (August 1,2002).
1, 2002).
Standards for Interrogation under 18 U.S.
c. §§
40. Id.
Id
41. Id
Id.
41.
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was necessary as a commander
commander in chief, it was easy to predict
predict a
political firestonn
firestorm that undermines
interrogation
undermines support for harsh interrogation
tactics and more generally harmed the Administration's
Administration's legal
credibility.
Assuming that the Administration
Administration chose not to obtain a framework
authorization
statute
for Congress, a far better way to achieve the
authorization
Administration's
of
Administration's objectives
objectives would have been to catalogue the kind of
interrogation
interrogation methods that the Administration actually wanted to use
and explain in some detail why those methods would not amount to
torture. This memo
memo would have been a far more limited and less
less
controversial opinion, although some would still have disagreed with
controversial
unnecessary claim
its analysis. It could also have omitted the unnecessary
claim that the
42
the
disregard
circumstances
some
in
President could
circumstances disregard the convention.
convention.42
This sweeping claim seems
seems to have been motivated by an interest in
restoring
general
executive
branch authority. But it is fanciful to
restoring
believe
believe that unilateral declarations by the Office
Office of Legal Counsel,
executive power, can accomplish
accomplish
known as the foremost defender
defender of executive
this goal. And by putting that expansion
expansion of executive
executive power in the
context of harsh treatment
of
detainees,
the
memo
set back the cause
treatment
which it was trying to promote.
IV.
IV.

WAR
TRIALS
WAR CRIMES
CRIMES TRIALs

The Administration
Administration again had legitimate objectives
objectives in establishing
military tribunals
tribunals to prosecute
prosecute some of the detainees for war crimes.
It wanted to bring those who violated the laws of war to justice and
deter subsequent
subsequent violations. But it did not want to use the Article
Article III
court system and all its protection. To do so would have exposed
national security infonnation
information in some cases. But more fundamentally,
our trial system would have taken a very long time and provided
provided a
panoply of rights that are important to protect
protect individual liberties
42. In fact, a subsequent
expressly
subsequent memo from the Office of Legal Counsel revoking
revoking the 2002 memo
memo expressly
stated
unnecessary to reach the issue of the President's constitutional authority. See
stated that it was unnecessary
Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General
Memorandum
General From Daniel Levin, Acting
Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal
Legal Counsel Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§
§§ 2340-2340A
2340--2340A (Dec. 30,
2004).
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within civil society,
society, but should
should not
not be extended to
to irregular
combatants whose activities
activities lie outside the social compact.
compact. Swift
Swift
is part of the
the necessary shock and awe
awe against
against war
military justice is
criminals.
But the Administration has succeeded in conducting only a very
few war crimes trials. One reason for the delays was that the
the
of rules for conducting
conducting the
the trials faced such
Administration's first set of
43
sent for revisions. 43
And even after
vigorous criticism that they were sent
revision many military lawyers within the Administration objected to
some of the provisions, creating a kind of bureaucratic
bureaucratic inertia that
delayed indictments. But the most important reason for delay were
defendants' successes in the lengthy constitutional
the war criminal defendants'
litigation over the procedures. In Hamdan
Hamdan v.
v. Rumsfeld the Court held
that some of the Administration's
Administration's procedures violated the Uniform
Military Code of Justice as well as Article III of the Geneva
according to the Court, Congress had made
Convention which, according
44
tribunals. 44
military
to
applicable to military tribunals.
This signal defeat was quite possibly related to previous mistakes
in legal strategy. Strikingly, the Court gave no deference
deference to the
in
Administration's
Administration's interpretation
interpretation of either
either the Uniform Military
Military Code
of Justice or Article
precedent
Article III of the Geneva
Geneva Convention, despite precedent
for deferring to the executive's
interpretation
of
treaties
and
statutes
executive's interpretation
45
governing
military. Whatever
of
governing the military.45
Whatever the doctrinal
doctrinal categories
categories of
deference,
deference, the general
general credibility
credibility of executive
executive branch positions
positions will
hugely
influence
the
actual
degree
hugely influence
degree of deference
deference the
the Court applies.
This had
been
damaged
by
previous
Administration
had
damaged
previous Administration legal
legal analysis,
like
like that
that contained
contained in the memo on interrogations,
interrogations, that the
Administration
Administration itself
itself had
had since repudiated.
repudiated.
In Hamdan
itself,
Justice
Breyer
Hamdan
Justice Breyer noted that "[n]othing
"[n]othing prevents
prevents the
President
from
returning
to
Congress
to
seek
the
authorization
President from
to
seek the authorization he
'
'46
believes
course, the President
President would not have had to
believes necessary.
necessary.'.46 Of course,
return to Congress
Congress and would not
not have
have faced substantial
substantial bureaucratic
bureaucratic
43.
43.
44.
44.
45.
45.
46.
46.

Neil
for War
2005, at
Neil A.
A. Lewis,
Lewis, U.S.
u.s. Alters
Alters Rules
Rules/or
War Crime
Crime Trials,
Trials, N.Y.
N.Y. TIMES,
TiMES, Sept.
Sept. 1,
1,2005,
at Al.
AI.
Hamdan
Hamdan v.
v. Rumsfeld,
Rumsfeld, 548
548 U.S.
U.S. 557,
557, 624-26
624-26 (2006).
(2006).
See
See Ex
Ex Parte
Parte Quirin,
Quirin, 317
317 U.S.
U.S. 1(1942).
1 (1942).
Hamdan,
Hamdan, 548
548 U.S.
U.S. at
at 636.
636.
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foot dragging
dragging had he sought congressional
congressional authorization for the
military tribunals in the first place. He almost certainly would have
gotten the procedures
procedures he desired, because
because even
even after the Supreme
Court defeat in Hamdan,
Hamdan, he got most of the procedures he had sought
sought
restrictions
on
the
use
of
hearsay
with some exceptions,
including
exceptions,
47
But the President was in a stronger
stronger
and classified information.47
political position in 2003 and probably even in 2001 than at the end
of 2006.
of2006.
V. SURVEILLANCE
v.
SURVEILLANCE

The Bush Administration
Administration also had a choice about whether to obtain
express authorization
authorization to undertake
undertake surveillance of individuals in the
express
United States
States who were in contact
contact with those in or near the
President's
battlefields
battlefields of terrorism. It decided to rely instead on the President's
authority as commander
commander in chief and the general authority of the
statute
statute that authorized the Administration
Administration to undertake military
actions against the terrorist organizations.
authorization
It was a mistake not to obtain express congressional authorization
for surveillance when it could have been easily been obtained.
Indeed, it may have run more substantial risks to rely on executive
executive
authority
and
authority in this regard
regard than in the area of detentions and
interrogations
interrogations for two reasons. First, Congress had already passed
framework legislation
legislation in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Surveillance Act
("FISA") that regulated
regulated the authority of the executive to wiretap
48
individuals
individuals residing in the United States.48
That legislation by its
the
authority
exercised
terms appears inconsistent
with
inconsistent
exercised by the
Administration because
Administration
because it requires warrants which the Administration
Administration
of
appears to contemplate its applicability in time of
has not sought. It appears
war, because it provided additional
additional time to obtain such warrants in
of
wartime. Second, because this surveillance was being undertaken
undertaken of
residents in the United States there was an even greater risk that
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
47. See Military Commissions Act of
of2006,
(codified as
Surveillance Act of 1978,
1978, Pub. L.
L. No. 95-511,
95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
48. Foreign
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
amended
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
amended in scattered
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executive discretion in
courts would not extend precedent
precedent to protect executive
this new kind of war.
Administration did finally seek congressional
The Bush Administration
congressional
authorization and on July 10, 2008,
2008, Congress amended FISA. 49 But
by waiting the Bush Administration
Administration in this area as in others harmed
harmed
its reputation
for
fidelity
to
law
and
thus
made
the
judiciary
less
reputation
likely to trust it with discretion
discretion or rule in its favor in close cases.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Administration's legal strategy
The Bush Administration's
strategy in the war on terror was
interest in establishing powerful
powerful
deeply flawed. Because
Because of its interest
precedent
executive powers, it took bold positions
positions that
precedent in favor of executive
risks
of
judicial
repudiation
failed
carried substantial
repudiation
and
to obtain
obtain
substantial
endorsement at times of political opportunity. As a result,
legislative endorsement
the Supreme Court said on two occasions the President was acting
illegally, confirming
confirming an impression
impression the President was a rogue
operator outside established law and popular
popular opinion. The lesson for
recognize that we live in a
future administrations
administrations seems clear. First, recognize
time of much more activist courts even in the era of foreign affairs.
of
That fact may be bemoaned but it cannot be ignored and the reality of
their possible
possible interventions must be factored into strategy from the
particularly
outset. Second, rely more on Congress than on courts, particularly
when the President
President enjoys support in the initial stages of the conflict
or his party controls Congress.
It is the executive's
executive's power to persuade
persuade from a position of strength
rather than formal legal powers that is the President's
President's greatest asset.
But it is generally a wasting asset and thus the President
President should
translate it into more lasting legislative tools before
before its dissipation.
The President
may
have
lost
the
war
in
Iraq
because
he did not call in
President
substantial losses his
enough troops after the fall of Baghdad. He had substantial
because he did not call on citizens through their
legal wars because
representatives to rally around a new, but carefully circumscribed,
representatives
circumscribed,

49. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261,
110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
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system of wartime detention and surveillance in a struggle whose
battlefields and duration have no clear limits.
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